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Are the security issues of IPv4 resolved with IPv6?

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Agenda

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- IPv6 Protocol Security
- IPv4 vs IPv6 Security
- MS Windows 2K/XP and IPv6
- Summary

IPv6 & Security

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- All implementations required to support authentication and encryption headers (AH and ESP of IPsec)
- Authentication separate from encryption for use in situations where encryption is prohibited or prohibitively expensive
- Key distribution protocols are under development (independent of IP v4/v6)
- Support for manual key configuration required

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Authentication Header (AH)

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| | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|----------|
| Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Reserved |
| Security Parameters Index (SPI) | | |
| Sequence Number | | |
| Authentication Data | | |

- Destination Address + SPI identifies security association state (key, lifetime, algorithm, etc.)
- Provides origin authentication, data integrity and anti-replay protection for all fields of IPv6 packet that do not change en-route
- Default algorithms are MD5/SHA-1

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Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

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| | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Security Parameters Index (SPI) | | |
| Sequence Number | | |
| Payload | | |
| Padding | Padding Length | Next Header |
| Authentication Data | | |

- Provides origin authentication, data integrity, anti-replay protection and confidentiality of the IPv6 packet payload
- Default algorithms are DES/3DES, MD-5, SHA-1

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What else does IPv6 for Security?

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- Security
 - Nothing IP4 doesn't do - IPsec runs in both and IPv6 mandates IPsec implementation.
 - Does a lot dynamically on L3 (via ICMP), hence remove part of L2 problems, right?
 - Supports "privacy" addressing scheme
 - Migration via dual stacks!

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IPv6 Security Exposures...

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
- Autoconfiguration
 - stateless configuration and discovery, contradicting requirements with security
- ICMPv6 protected by IPsec
 - security bootstrap problem
- DAD
 - duplicate address detection mechanism

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Stateless autoconfiguration

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
Router solicitation are sent by booting nodes to request RAs for configuring the interfaces.

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Neighbor Discovery - Neighbor Solicitation

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


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DAD (Duplicate Address Detection)

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
- Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) uses neighbor solicitation to verify the existence of an address to be configured.

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Neighbor Discovery - Redirect

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


- Redirect is used by a router to signal the reroute of a packet to a better router.

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IPv4: Source Routing Security Problem




Routing based on IPv4 datagram option

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IPv4 Spoofing Using Source Routing




Back traffic uses the same source route

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IPv6 Routing Header




- Routing header is:
 - An extension header.
 - Processed by the listed intermediate routers.

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IPv6 Routing Header



- Routing type 0: Routers list = 3ffe:0b00:0:1::1, 3ffe:0b00:0:3::1

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IPv6 Routing Header (cont.)

| | IPv6 header fields | | Routing | |
|------|--------------------|------------|----------|--|
| | Src. Add. | Dest. Add. | Seg left | |
| A->B | A | B | 2 | |
| B->C | A | C | 1 | |
| C->D | A | D | 0 | |


Packet flowing through the network

Routing header IPv6 ⇌ Source routing in IPv4
« Cannot be turned off (like 'no ip source-route' in IPv4) cause it is REQUIRED for mobile IPv6 ! »
Solution: Use extended ACL (if mobile IPv6 not required)

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Mobile IP - security still work in progress



- Mobility means:
 - Mobile devices are fully supported while moving
 - Built-in on IPv6
 - Any node can use it
 - Efficient routing means performance for end-users

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IPv4 Normal Fragmentation/Reassembly

Received from the network:

| | |
|----------------|-----------------|
| TL=500, FO=0 | data length 480 |
| TL=360, FO=960 | data length 340 |
| TL=500, FO=480 | data length 480 |

Reassembly buffer, 65,535 bytes



Kernel memory at destination host

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IPv4 Reassembly Attack

Received from the network:

| | |
|---|------------------|
| TL=1020, FO=0 | data length 1000 |
| ... 64 IP fragments with data length 1000 ... | |
| TL=1020, FO=65000 | data length 1000 |

BUG: buffer exceeded

Reassembly buffer, 65,535 bytes




Kernel memory at destination host

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Fragment Header - IPv6




- In IPv6 fragmentation is done **ONLY** by the end system
- Reassembly done by end system like in IPv4

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ICMPv6




- ICMPv6 is similar to IPv4:
Provides diagnostic and error messages
Is used for path MTU discovery
Runs on top of IPv6!

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IPv6 protocol for MS WinXP (DISCLAIMER!)



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IPv6 & MS 2K/XP

```
C:\>ipconfig -?
usage: ipconfig [-v] if [ifindex]
ipconfig [-p] ifor v6v4 v4src v4dst [nd] [pmlid]
ipconfig [-p] ifor 6over4 v4src
ipconfig no [ifindex [address]]
ipconfig ncf [ifindex [address]]
ipconfig rc [ifindex address]
ipconfig rcf [ifindex [address]]
ipconfig bc
...
ipconfig [-p] rtu prefix ifindex/[address] [life valid[/pref]]
[preference P] [publish] [age] [spl SitePrefixLength]
...
ipconfig install
ipconfig uninstall
```

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IPv6 protocol for Win XP/2K features

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
- 6to4 tunneling (RFC 3056)
- ISATAP
 - Intrasite Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol
 - (draft-ietf-ngtrans-isatap-00.txt)
- 6over4 tunneling (RFC 2529)
- Anonymous addresses (64-bit rnd) [**privacy**]
- Site prefixes in router advertisements
- DNS support (RFC 1886)
- IPsec support (AH-MD5, Null-ESP, ESP-MD5 auth*only*) [**integrity, auth**]
- Static router support (ipv6 rtu)
- Application support (IE Explorer, telnet, ftp, ping6, tracert6, RPC)

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IPv6/IPv4 Dual Stack Approach

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
- Dual stack node means:
 - Both IPv4 and IPv6 stacks enabled
 - Applications can talk to both
 - Choice of the IPv4 or IPv6 is based on name lookup and app. preference

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Dual Stack Approach & VPN

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- In a dual stack case & VPN tunnel with non-split tunnelling policy:
 - All IPv4 traffic is non-split tunnelled through VPN tunnel
 - All IPv6 traffic is going out (and in) in the clear as a policy violation(?)

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IPv6 vs. IPv4 Security Summary

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
| Service | IPv4 Solution | IPv6 Solution |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Fragmentation | Router or end node can fragment | Only end nodes can fragment |
| Source routing | Could be disabled | Routing Hdr required for Mobile IPv6 |
| ICMP Redirection | no ip icmp redirect | no ipv6 redirect |
| Duplicate addressing | No protection | No protection |
| Privacy | Layer 3 | Layer 2-3 |
| Integ/Auth/Confid. | IPsec | IPsec Mandated |

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Questions?

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