IPv6 Protocol
Does it solve all the security problems of IPv4?

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
Cisco Systems, Inc.

Agenda

- **IPv6 Primer**

- **IPv6 Protocol Security**

- **Dual stack approach**

- **Q&A**

IPv4 & IPv6 Header Comparison

IPv4 Header

Version	IHL	Type of Service	Total Length
Identification		Flags	Fragment Offset
Time to Live	Protocol	Header Checksum	
Source Address			
Destination Address			
Options			Padding

Legend

- field's name kept from IPv4 to IPv6
- fields not kept in IPv6
- Name & position changed in IPv6
- New field in IPv6

IPv6 Header

Version	Traffic Class	Flow Label
Payload Length	Next Header	Hop Limit
Source Address		
Destination Address		

IPv6 Header Options (RFC 2460)

IPv6 Header Next Header = TCP | **TCP Header + Data**

**IPv6 Header Next Header = Routing** | **Routing Header Next Header = TCP** | **TCP Header + Data**

IPv6 Header Next Header = Routing | **Routing Header Next Header = Fragment** | **Fragment Header Next Header = TCP** | **Fragment of TCP Header + Data**

- **Processed only by node identified in IPv6 Destination Address field => much lower overhead than IPv4 options**
  - exception: Hop-by-Hop Options header
- **Eliminated IPv4's 40-octet limit on options**
  - in IPv6, limit is total packet size, or Path MTU in some cases

IPv6 Security Options

- **All implementations required to support authentication and encryption headers (AH and ESP of IPsec)**

- **Authentication separate from encryption for use in situations where encryption is prohibited or prohibitively expensive**

- **Key distribution protocols are under development (independent of IP v4/v6)**

- **Support for manual key configuration required**

Authentication Header (AH)

Next Header	Hdr Ext Len	Reserved
Security Parameters Index (SPI)		
Sequence Number		
Authentication Data		

- **Destination Address + SPI identifies security association state (key, lifetime, algorithm, etc.)**

- **Provides *origin authentication*, *data integrity* and *anti-replay protection* for all fields of IPv6 packet that do not change en-route**

- **Default algorithms are MD5/SHA-1**

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

Security Parameters Index (SPI)
Sequence Number
Payload
Padding		Padding Length	Next Header
Authentication Data

- Provides *origin authentication*, *data integrity*, *anti-replay protection* and *confidentiality* of the IPv6 packet payload

- Default algorithms are DES/3DES, MD-5,SHA-1

What else does IPv6 for Security?

- **Security**
  - – **Nothing IP4 doesn't do - IPsec runs on both and IPv6 _mandates_ IPsec implementation.**
  - – **Does a lot dynamically on L3 (via ICMP), hence remove part of L2 problems, right?**
  - – **Supports "privacy" addressing scheme**
  - – **Migration via dual stacks!**

IPv6 Security Exposures…

- **Autoconfiguration**
  - *stateless configuration and discovery, contradicting requirements with security*

- **ICMPv6 protected by IPsec**
  - *security bootstrap problem*

- **DAD**
  - *duplicate address detection mechanism*

Stateless autoconfiguration

1. RS

2. RA

1. RS:

ICMP Type = 133

Src = ::

Dst = All-Routers multicast Address

query= please send RA

2. RA:

ICMP Type = 134

Src = Router Link-

Dst = All-nodes multicast address

Data= options, prefix, lifetime, autoconfig flag

ICMP w/o IPsec AH⇔ gives exactly same level of security as ARP for IPv4 (none)

Bootstrap security problem!

Potential solution: 802.1x or CGA

Router solicitation are sent by booting nodes to request RAs for configuring the interfaces.

Neighbor Discovery - Neighbor Solicitation

ICMP type = 135   Src =
A   Dst =
Solicited-node multicast of B Data =
link-layer address of A
Query = what is your link address?

ICMP ty
B
Data = link-layer address of B

**A and B can now exchange packets
on this link**

Security mechanisms built into discovery protocol ⇔ None.

Bootstrap security problem!

Potential solution: 802.1x or CGA

DAD (Duplicate Address Detection)

A

B

ICMP type = 135   Src =

0 (::)   ~~Dst =~~

Solicited-node multicast of *A* Data =

**link-layer address of A**

Query = what is your link address?

From RFC 2462:

« If a duplicate @ is discovered … the address *cannot* be assigned to the interface…»

⇔ What if: Use MAC@ of the node you want to DoS and fabricate its IPv6 @

- **Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) uses neighbor solicitation to verify the existence of an address to be configured.**

Neighbor Discovery - Redirect

A

In IPv4: « no ip icmp redirect »

In IPv6: « no ipv6 redirect »

R1

Src = A   **Dst**
IP = 3FFE:B00:C18:2::1   **Dst**
Ethernet = R2 (default router)

Redirect:
Src = R2
Dst = A
Data = good router = R1

3FFE:B00:C18:2::/64

- **Redirect is used by a router to signal the reroute of a packet to a better router.**

IPv4 Spoofing using Source Routing

B is a friend allow access

Rb

B

In IPv4: - router configurable command «no ip source-route» solves the problem,

…what about IPv6?

B->A via C,Rc Ra

A->B via Ra, Rc,C

A

Ra

B->A via C,Rc,Ra

A->B via Ra, Rc,C

Rc

C

B->A via C, Rc,Ra

A->B via Ra, Rc,C

Back traffic uses the same source route

Mobile IP
- security still work in progress

Home Agent

Destination Node

Not Poss

Mobile Node

2001:2:a010::5   2001:2:a010::5

Mobility and security elements of mobile IPv6 still work in progress… (MIPv6 draft authentication).

- **Mobility means:**

    Mobile devices are fully supported whil

    Built-in on IPv6

        Any node can use it

    Efficient routing means performance for end-users

IPv6/IPv4 Dual Stack Approach

Application

TCP   **UDP**

IPv4   **IPv6**

0x0800   0x86dd

Data Link (Ethernet)

IPv6-enabled Application

TCP   **UDP**

IPv4   **IPv6**

0x0800   0x86dd

Frame Protocol ID

- **Dual stack node means:**

    Both IPv4 and IPv6 stacks enabled

    Applications can talk to both

    Choice of the IPv4 or IPv6 is based on name lookup and app. preference

Dual Stack Approach & VPN

3ffe:b00::1
192.168.x.z

IPv4

192.168.x.y

IPv6

3ffe:b00::1

If the VPN policy allows no split tunneling, does the dual stack approach supports it?

- **In a dual stack case & VPN tunnel with non-split tunneling policy:**

  - **All IPv4 traffic is non-split tunneled through VPN tunnel**

  - **All IPv6 traffic is going out (and in) in the clear as a policy violation(?)**

IPv6 vs. IPv4 Security Summary

Service	IPv4 Solution	IPv6 Solution
Fragmentation	Router or end node can fragment	Only end nodes can fragment
Source routing	Could be disabled	Routing Hdr required for Mobile IPv6
ICMP Redirection	no ip icmp redirect	no ipv6 redirect
Duplicate addressing	No protection	No protection
Privacy	Layer 3	Layer 2-3
Integ/Auth/Confid.	IPSec	IPSec Mandated

Questions?

References

Forums and test beds:

    www.6net.org

    www.6bone.net

    www.ipv6forum.com

Vendor links:

    www.cisco.com/ipv6

    www.microsoft.com/ipv6

Other useful links:

    www.kame.net

    www.bieringer.de/linux/IPv6

    www.hs247.com

    www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-send-psreq-03.txt

    www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-send-cga-01.txt

Thank you!

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IPv6 Protocol

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